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Since the BOP crisis of 1991 there have been two views of the macro-economics of the 
Indian economy.  One is the standard model of the open economy (widely applied and accepted 
in the advanced economies) that shows strong trade-offs between a stable exchange rate and 
monetary independence in the presence of global capital mobility.  This is summarised in the 
“impossible trinity” namely that a country cannot simultaneously have an open capital account, a 
fixed exchange rate and monetary policy independence. This paper shows that net capital inflows 
during 1993-4 and 1994-5 were met by un-sterilised intervention: RBI purchased foreign 
exchange to keep the nominal exchange rate constant and thus to keep the real rate from 
appreciating.  It concludes that as a consequence reserve money and M3 expanded leading to 
higher inflation and consequent real exchange rate appreciation.  The paper then contrasts this 
with the second episode of capital inflows starting in April 2002, which was handled by sterilised 
intervention and reduced monetary growth. Inflation remained low but the gap between Indian 
and global short-term interest rates widened and the fiscal costs of accumulating reserves rose 
sharply.  
An alternative Keynsian model with growth cycles seems more appropriate to some, for 
poor highly populated Asian economies like India.  When the growth rate is high (above trend) 
there will be pressure on non-tradable infrastructure sectors and the economy will behave very 
much like the neo-classical full employment economy.  The “impossible trinity” will have 
relevance in this situation. When the growth rate is low (below trend) it will behave much more 
like a Keynsian economy, with monetary/fiscal policy as potential drivers of short-term recovery, 
with any government debt accumulation still having a negative effect on interest rates in the 
medium term. From this perspective the 1991-1992 reforms transformed the investment 
environment leading to a fast recovery from the 1991-2 crisis and large capital flows ($6 bi 
between October 1993 and September 1994).  The savings inflow reduced interest rates (on 91 
day treasury bills) during 1993-94.  Thereafter, rising investment led to rising interest rates as 
demand for credit increased along with economic growth which rose to unprecedented highs 
during 1994-5 to 1996-7.  Inflation also rose from June 1993 given the constrained supply of  
(inefficient public monopoly) non-tradable infrastructure services, with money supply 
accommodating the rising demand for money from April 1994.  In contrast the growth rate of the 
Indian economy, private credit demand, long term interest rates and  inflation have been on a 
downtrend since 1997.  Thus in 2002-3, sterilised intervention did not lead to a rise in interest 
rates (on 91day T bills). Short term interests may however been held up by controls and RBI 
policy resulting in a flat term structure, a rising gap between global and domestic overnight rates 
and consequent arbitrage flows. 
The current paper brings out some of these issues in a very simple and effective way, 
though it does not directly address the Keynsian growth hypothesis.  It also makes a case for the 
operation of the “impossible trinity” given the opening of our capital account, and shows how the 
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Currency management in India has focused on delivering low levels of currency volatil-
ity. In earlier years, the implementation of the currency regime was enabled by the pres-
ence of capital controls. In recent years, India has made much progress towards capital
account convertibility. This paper closely examines India’s experience with the implemen-
tation of the currency regime in two episodes: 1993-95 and after 2002. We argue that the
implementation of the existing currency regime now induces distorted monetary policy
and ﬁscal costs. These costs of implementing the currency regime need to be factored into
the choice of currency regime.
∗This paper grew out of conversations with Ajay Shah. The views in this paper are my own. I would also
like to thank the Arvind Virmani, S. Narayan, Shankar Acharya, Suman Bery, Vijay Kelkar, Ashok Lahiri and
Kenneth Kletzer for useful discussions, and Monika Sharma for excellent research assistance.
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A key idea in modern open economy macroeconomics is the notion that when a country with
an open capital account tries to implement a ﬁxed exchange rate, it loses monetary policy
independence. While few countries operate ﬁxed exchange rates, more generally, this idea
suggests that there may be tradeoﬀs between a stable exchange rate and an independent
monetary policy.
India embarked upon liberalisation of the current account and the capital account in 1991.
Today there exist a number of channels, legal and illegal, through which capital ﬂows can
take place. Considerable amounts of domestic and foreign capital can ﬂow in and out of India
in response to interest diﬀerentials and currency expectations.
In 1993, India shifted towards a ‘market determined exchange rate’, where the exchange rate
was determined on a market and not administratively determined. The behaviour of the
rupee has, however, remained largely unchanged since 1979. Over this period, the rupee has
been a de facto peg to the US dollar with low currency ﬂexibility. The implementation of this
currency regime has been mainly through direct intervention by RBI on the foreign exchange
market.
We can envision two important ramiﬁcations of RBI’s currency interventions.
In terms of the direct impact, intervention (purchase of dollars) may have a monetary impact
where the accumulation of reserves results in an increase in money supply. These eﬀects
can be ‘sterilised’, where the increase in reserves is oﬀset by an sale of government securities
leaving no impact on reserve money. In this case, there will be ‘quasi-ﬁscal costs’ deriving
from the substitution of domestic assets by foreign assets on the central bank’s balance sheet.
In addition, sterilised intervention is limited in the following sense: when RBI sells bonds,
this tends to drive up domestic interest rates and invite further capital inﬂows.
In addition, a managed exchange rate can provide proﬁtable opportunities for speculators. If
RBI purchases $1 billion at Rs.46 from a speculator, and sells them back to the speculator at
Rs.45, there is a ﬁscal cost of Rs.100 crore.
At the extreme, if speculators come to believe that the currency regime is unsustainable,
there can be a speculative attack on the currency. Traditionally, there has been a focus on
speculative attacks where a currency experiences a sharp devaluation.
The opposite is also feasible. Extremely large amounts of capital will come into India if
speculators have expectations of a sharp appreciation of the rupee. A scenario in which a
reverse speculative attack can come about is one where (a) speculators believe that the central
bank will not engage in nonsterilised intervention, and (b) it is apparent that the central bank
is running out of tools for sterilisation. Similarly, if speculators believe that the ﬁscal costs
of maintaining the regime are unsustainable, given India’s ﬁscal problems, this could result
in a reverse speculative attack.
With this conceptual framework, in this paper, we closely examine two episodes in India’s
recent history.
The ﬁrst one, which we label Episode I, took place with the surge in capital inﬂows into the
country in 1993. At this time, RBI chose to intervene strongly to prevent a rupee appreciation
3and maintained a ﬁxed parity currency regime at Rs.31.37 per dollar. At the time, open
market operations were not a viable strategy. At ﬁrst, reserves accumulation led to a rise
in M3 growth. RBI chose to engage in a monetary tightening, to bring down the money
multiplier, in order to try to contain M3 growth.
Episode II began with a strong current account in 2001-02. From 1999-00 to 2001-02, net
capital inﬂows into India were remarkably stable at around $10 billion per year. Episode II
was initiated by a change on the current account of $6.1 billion per year over this period.
The rupee was under pressure to appreciate. RBI purchased dollars intensively in preventing
large moves of the exchange rate on any one day. In this fashion, the operation of the currency
regime led to a sharp reserves accretion.
In terms of monetary consequences, this time, RBI was able to exploit the market development
of the government bond market. It was able to sell bonds through open market operations
and achieve sterilisation. Money supply growth did not go up. However, government had to
incur quasi-ﬁscal costs.
The operation of the currency regime also led to speculative views about future rupee appre-
ciation. Until July 2002, typically, the INR-USD forward premium embedded expectations
of rupee depreciation. From July to November 2002, the forward premium suggested that
the market did not expect a change in the exchange rate. From November 2002 onwards, the
forward premium suggests that there are expectations about a further rupee appreciation.
This has ignited capital inﬂows. These capital inﬂows have, in turn, fueled reserves accretion.
These experiences highlight the applicability of the logic of open economy macroeconomics
for India today. India appears to have made enough progress on opening the capital account,
so that currency policy comes at the price of distortions in monetary policy. This is a diﬀerent
environment from that present in preceding decades, when it appeared that it was possible to
implement the prevailing currency regime without a price in loss of autonomy on monetary
policy.
Episode II has also given India a taste of how every currency peg is vulnerable to currency
forecasting and speculation. While there may be rules in place which apparently prevent
certain forms of currency speculation, there is enough openness on the current account and
the capital account, through which currency speculation is taking place.
In terms of currency ﬂexibility, India is strikingly embedded in the economic philosophy of
the late 1970s. This paper argues that in the new framework of capital account convertibility,
there are new costs of upholding such a currency regime. The beneﬁts of this currency regime
may well outweigh these costs. But it is important that these costs be recognised, measured,
and factored into policy analysis.
2 Implications of the impossible trinity for India
A key insight of open economy macroeconomics, which has come to prominence in recent
decades, has been the idea of the ‘impossible trinity’ (Mundell 1961). This consists of the
assertion that no country can simultaneously have an open capital account, a ﬁxed exchange
rate, and monetary policy independence. Speciﬁcally, once the capital account is open, and









































the exchange rate is ﬁxed, monetary policy becomes determined by the needs of preserving
the ﬁxed exchange rate.
Suppose a central bank embarks on tight monetary policy with an open capital account and a
ﬁxed exchange rate. Tight monetary policy gives higher interest rates, which attract capital
inﬂows. The central bank has to buy foreign currency in order to prevent appreciation. This
gives higher money supply, which frustrates the attempt at having tight monetary policy.
Few countries today adhere to the extreme position of having a ﬁxed exchange rate. How-
ever, many countries which try to ‘manage’ a ‘market determined exchange rate’ face similar
conﬂicts. If the focus on the stability of the exchange rate is greater, a central bank may
be willing to sacriﬁce autonomy of monetary policy. Indeed, the greater the extent to which
the central bank targets a stable exchange rate, the greater the loss of control over domestic
money supply.
In the post-war years, many countries chose to have autonomy in currency policy and mone-
tary policy, and obtained this by closing the capital account. The steady increase in openness
on the capital account, in recent decades, is forcing many countries to now grapple with the
tradeoﬀ between preserving currency policy and preserving monetary policy independence.
Figure 1 illustrates this idea using a scatter diagram, using data for 24 countries from Baig
(2001), where the currency volatility and the interest rate volatility in the year 2000 are
superposed. Broadly speaking, it appears that countries with lower currency volatility have
higher interest rate volatility.
Under an open capital account, is a currency peg even feasible, given the liquidity of modern
ﬁnancial markets? There is a common perception that in a world where currency market
5turnover exceeds $1 trillion a day, and the resources available to speculators on ﬁnancial
markets vastly exceed those with most governments, the defence of a currency peg is infeasible.
However, as Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (1995) emphasise, the breakdown of a currency peg is seldom
related to the physical inability of a central bank to defend a peg. They observe:
If central banks virtually always have the resources to crush speculators, why do they
suﬀer periodic humiliations by foreign exchange markets? The problem, of course, is that
very few central banks will cling to an exchange-rate target without regard to what is
happening in the rest of the economy. Domestic political realities simply will not allow
it, even when agreements with foreign governments are at stake.
Most currency regimes can be defended, if monetary policy can be suﬃciently subordinated to
the goals of exchange rate stability. However, the welfare costs of such a course may often be
unpalatable, and few governments have the political will to single-mindedly pursue exchange
rate policy at the expense of monetary policy distortions. In this sense, the breakdown of
a currency regime generally takes place when the political cost of upholding the regime is
unacceptably high.
How relevant is the impossible trinity for thinking about India’s problems? Figure 1 shows
that India features a policy choice involving high interest rate volatility and low currency
volatility. The recent literature (Patnaik 2003, Calvo & Reinhart 2002, Reinhart & Rogoﬀ
2002) has argued that India has had highly limited currency ﬂexibility over the 1979-2003
period. This literature has shown that while India made a great deal of progress on removing
restrictions on the current account and capital account in recent decades, little has changed
in terms of exchange rate ﬂexibility.
The conceptual framework of the impossible trinity implies that as liberalisation of the current
account and the capital account came about, India should have steadily faced constraints
whereby monetary policy came to be strongly inﬂuenced by the compulsions of maintaining
the currency regime (Joshi 2003). The implementation of low levels of currency volatility
in 1979 could involve very diﬀerent consequences, as compared with the implementation of
that very regime in 2003, given a very diﬀerent environment on the openness of the capital
account.
2.1 How open is India’s capital account?
The key question in thinking about the relevance of the impossible trinity for Indian macro
policy is: Does India have an open capital account? It is often argued that India has a fairly
closed capital account, and can hence continue to decouple currency policy from monetary
policy. Indeed, many observers have argued that India was unaﬀected by the East Asian crisis
owing to a closed capital account.
How open is India’s capital account? To what extent can domestic and foreign economic
agents move resources across the border, in response to speculative views about ex-ante rates
of return? It is observed that even in the nineties trade misinvoicing on the current account
was a signiﬁcant route for capital ﬂows (Patnaik & Vasudevan 2000). There now appear to
be many avenues through which asset market considerations, about ex-ante rates of returns,
6can shape capital ﬂows. These avenues can be used to move resources in and out of India,
and engage in currency speculation. These include:
• For foreign investors, there is substantial openness through FII and FDI routes. FII investment
into the equity market is largely unconstrained. However, FII investments into bonds fall under
the existing capital controls governing external commercial borrowings.
• Indian ﬁrms can engage in foreign currency borrowing, subject to certain restrictions. Specu-
lative views about the currency can sometimes be expressed using prepayment as opposed to
rollover of foreign loans. One avenue through which Indian ﬁrms have been engaging in oﬀshore
borrowing is through trade credit, which is now freely permitted for horizons upto three years.
• A broad range of entities can choose to hedge or not-hedge using the INR-USD forward market,
which can be used as a tool for expressing speculative views about the exchange rate.
• Firms can engage in currency speculation using the OTC derivatives market. The OTC deriva-
tives market features zero transparency and weak regulations, and is hence a useful vehicle for
such transactions.
• Indian ﬁrms have ﬂexibility in pre-payment or delaying payments for current account trans-
actions, which can be utilised to implement capital movements or speculative views on the
exchange rate.
• NRI deposits are a channel through which currency speculation can be done.
• Gold is a vehicle through which many capital account transactions can now be eﬀected without
running afoul of currency controls.
• There are legal mechanisms through which individuals can send a few thousand dollars out of
the country. If such windows are used by suﬃciently many households, they could add up to
substantial capital ﬂows.
Going beyond these legal avenues, illegal channels like over-invoicing and under-invoicing of
imports and exports still exist. Myriad Indian ﬁrms are now tightly interwoven into global
production chains with complex contractual arrangements. Transfer pricing can be used
within these existing trade relationships to implement capital ﬂows. India has substantial
export-oriented industries in ﬁelds such as gems, software, etc. In these areas, it is particularly
diﬃcult for a government agency to detect signiﬁcant capital ﬂows disguised as over-invoicing
or under-invoicing.
At ﬁrst glance, India appears to have an elaborate set of currency controls and restrictions
through which movements of capital, and currency speculation, are sought to be limited.
The arguments above suggest that these eﬀorts may be fairly futile in terms of actually
impeding the movement of capital across the border and inhibiting currency speculation.
There is a need to review this framework of controls in terms of evaluating their direct costs
of implementation, and the deeper distortions that they induce, given that the capital account
is (in any case) susbtantially open.
In an ideal neoclassical world, inﬁnite capital would be deployed when economic agents have
sound forecasts about a future asset price movement. India is in an intermediate stage where
substantial (though not inﬁnite) capital can come to play when expectations of a price move-
ment exist. The amounts of capital that appear to be mobile now seem to be large when
compared with the magnitudes seen in the balance of payments.
7Hence, today, it appears that there is a case for ascribing substantial openness to the present
situation with India’s capital account. To the extent that this is the case, the impossible
trinity becomes an important conceptual framework in understanding macro-policy in India.
Speciﬁcally, obtaining low currency volatility through a de facto peg to the USD would come
at the price of independent monetary policy under certain circumstances. In this paper, we
examine these relationships in two speciﬁc episodes.
3 Currency regime in India
Open economy macroeconomics ﬁrst became relevant in India in the early 1990s. After many
decades of exchange rate controls, India liberalised the current account in July 1991. After a
2 year period of transition, the rupee became fully “market determined” in 1993.
In 1993, the capital account was opened, and foreign portfolio investment came into domestic
capital markets. For a wide variety of foreign investors, India has capital account convert-
ibility. At the same time, domestic markets were liberalised to move away from administered
interest rates. This has created a new and challenging environment for the conduct of mone-
tary and currency policy.
While the capital account was opened up, the rupee continued to be managed by the RBI.
Evidence from a number of studies that characterise India’s currency regime suggest that
the rupee has been nominally pegged to the US dollar since 1979 (Patnaik 2003, Calvo &
Reinhart 2002, Reinhart & Rogoﬀ 2002). Sometimes, there has been a ﬁxed exchange rate
peg (such as the period in the 1990s where the exchange rate was Rs.31.37 per dollar).
According to RBI, the exchange rate is “market determined”, in the sense that there is a
currency market and the exchange rate is not administratively determined. However, RBI
actively intervenes on the market, with the stated goal of “containing volatility”. In practice,
this gives a crawling peg, where changes in the exchange rate are smoothed over a long time
period.
Currency intervention by the RBI in the 1990s has usually taken the form of a net purchase
of dollars that prevented the rupee from appreciating. Episodes of sale of dollars by the RBI
have been far and few. One notable episode was during the Asian crisis when the RBI stepped
in to support the rupee.
India has experienced market-oriented reforms in many aspects of the economy over the 1980s
and 1990s. In each of these areas, the reforms of the last two decades have reduced the role of
government in price formation, moved away from ﬁxed or administered prices, and increased
the reliance upon economic adjustment through responses to the free movement of prices.
However, these kinds of reforms have not taken place in the context of exchange rate policy,
where standard metrics show that there has been no substantial change in currency ﬂexibility
from 1979 onwards.
4 Currency intervention and its consequences
RBI faces three paths for implementation of India’s de facto peg to the USD:
8• Direct intervention on the currency market,
• Intervention on the currency market at the behest of RBI through other banks such as SBI,1
• Indirect instruments: money supply, interest rates, administrative controls.
It is sometimes argued that currency management can be done in isolation, without aﬀecting
other aspects of the macro-economy. It is felt that RBI can modify the market price of the
rupee by purchasing or selling USD, which would increase or decrease the size of foreign
currency reserves, without incurring any other costs. Such a position was well justiﬁed prior
to 1992, given the level of repression on current account and capital account transactions that
prevailed in India, backed by fera. However, there is a considerable clarity in the ﬁeld of
open economy macroeconomics, on the downstream ramiﬁcations of currency intervention,
which suggests that the implementation of currency policy in an open economy does have
important costs, and consequences for macro-policy.
There are broadly two parallel strands of thought on this question:
• The ﬁrst explores the monetary impact of currency intervention, where policy makers are faced
with the choice of distorted money supply (and its consequences) or sterilisation (and its con-
sequences). When sterilisation takes place, it has ﬁscal costs.
• The second strand of thought focuses on the direct ﬁscal costs of coping with successful spec-
ulative behaviour by private actors. With increasing openness of the capital account, many
economic agents will engage in currency speculation, which can often generate speculative prof-
its at the expense of the central bank and (ultimately) the exchequer.
4.1 Monetary implications
At the root of the conﬂict between currency policy and monetary policy lies the expansion in
the monetary base due to the central bank’s intervention in the currency market. The basic
relationship is:
∆M3 = m(∆NFA + ∆RCG)
where M3 is broad money, m is the money multiplier, nfa are the net foreign assets and rcg
is the RBI credit to government. When RBI buys USD on the currency market, nfa goes up.
This relationship suggests two avenues for mounting a response:
Impact on reserve money The rise in NFA can be ‘sterilised’ by reducing the central banks’s credit
to the government. As Kletzer & Spiegel (2000) say:
Sterilisation is usually the ﬁrst policy response to a sudden rise in ﬁnancial capital in-
ﬂows. Under this policy central, banks swap domestic securities, such as government
treasury obligations, for incoming foreign assets. The net impact of a sterilisation
exercise is that the monetary base is unchanged, but the share of foreign reserves in
central bank asset holdings have increased.
1For example, Ghosh (2002) uses newspaper reports about SBI purchases of USD as a proxy for RBI
interventions. However, in this paper, as we focus on the impact of intervention on reserve money and therefore
only on the net foreign exchange assets of the RBI, we look only at the RBI’s direct intervention.
9In the extreme, if the change in net foreign exchange assets (NFA) is fully matched by an
oﬀsetting change in reserve bank credit to the government (RCG), there is no change in money
supply (M3). Another channel for sterilisation, which has been used by RBI to a substantial
extent in 2003, consists of borrowing from banks through the repo market. Here, government
bonds are pledged to banks when borrowing from them, instead of being sold outright to them
through open market operations.
It is now well understood that sterilised intervention only works to a limited extent and only
in the short run. The key insight lies in the fact that selling government bonds in the domestic
market tends to raise domestic interest rates, which invites further capital ﬂows.
Impact on money multiplier The second strategy which a central bank can adopt is to exploit
monetary tightening which would reduce the money multiplier m. This would involve policy
initiatives such as raising CRR, forcing public sector entities to directly hold accounts with the
RBI, etc.
4.2 Speculation
In a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, exchange rates are ‘ordinary’ ﬁnancial time-series. A ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate which is formed in a speculative price process is essentially like the prices
produced in other speculative markets, such as the securities markets where governments
do not directly participate. In such regimes, currencies generally follow random walks, and
currency forecasting is not proﬁtable. If the exchange rate is martingale, the best predictor
of a future exchange rate is the present exchange rate. In the ﬁnance literature, this is called
‘an eﬃcient market’.
When the exchange rate is not ﬂoating, and there are opportunities for forecasting, economic
agents can be expected to engage in a wide variety of strategies to exploit these forecasts:
• In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, normally, central banks suﬀer from no speculative losses. How-
ever, near-inﬁnite capital would be brought to bear when speculators believe that the ﬁxed
exchange rate peg would break. When a speculative attack takes place, central banks can suﬀer
substantial losses.
• In a crawling peg, if there is non-random walk behaviour, and future exchange rates can be
forecasted, then economic agents would try to exploit these forecasts. In the case of India,
Patnaik (2003) documents violations of the random walk for the INR/USD exchange rate.
When a central bank intervenes strongly in order to maintain a crawling peg, it can incur
substantial losses owing to successful speculation. When a speculator sells $1 billion to RBI
at Rs.46/$, and buys it back at Rs.45/$, RBI makes a loss of Rs.100 crore. Speculators may
see such proﬁtable opportunities when there is a large fundamental move in the exchange rate,
which is broken up into many small one-day moves owing to the operation of a crawling peg.
Speculative attacks are dramatic and important events. The classical logic of the speculative
attack applies when rational economic agents perceive that a currency is overvalued, and that
the central bank has run out of ammunition to defend it (Krugman 1979). When expectations
of a devaluation set in, rational agents are likely to utilise all avenues (legal and illegal) in
order to take capital out of the country. In the environment of a speculative attack, capital
ﬂight becomes a one-way bet for a rational economic agent. If there were a speculative attack
on the rupee, a person who converts INR into USD, and invests in US treasury bills, stands
10to earn a return equal to (a) the return on a US treasury bill plus (b) the depreciation of the
rupee.
In an environment of a speculative attack, where a central bank is supporting an artiﬁcially
overvalued exchange rate, there is a rush to use the distorted exchange rate to take capital out
of the country. This leads to a phenomenon where central bank reserves are swiftly depleted,
after which devaluation must inevitably follow. Speciﬁcally, the time-series of the stock of
reserves shows an abrupt drop in the period of a speculative attack.
In an environment of a speculative attack, it is particularly diﬃcult for a central bank to
make small adjustments in the exchange rate. A small depreciation gives proﬁts to rational
speculators, and can encourage even larger speculative positions.
In the present situation in India, it is useful to think about the reverse scenario. This has been
studied in Grilli (1986). We call this a ‘reverse speculative attack’ (rsa) In a rsa, rational
economic agents perceive that the central bank is at the limits of its ability to maintain an
artiﬁcially undervalued currency. When expectations of an appreciation set in, rational agents
would use every means possible (legal or illegal) to bring capital into the country.
If an appreciation of the rupee appears very likely, then for a person who converts USD into
INR, and invests in GOI treasury bills, the total return works out to (a) the return on a GOI
treasury bill plus (b) the depreciation of the USD. Once such expectations set in, there would
be a rush by economic agents to exploit the above strategies, and try to get into INR at the
prevailing (undervalued) rate. Speciﬁcally, the time-series of the stock of reserves would show
an abrupt rise in the period of a rsa.
In an environment of a reverse speculative attack, it may be diﬃcult for a central bank to
make small adjustments in the exchange rate. A small appreciation would give proﬁts to the
rational speculators who have already established positions, and could encourage even larger
speculative positions.
A rsa is clearly diﬀerent from a conventional speculative attack, insofar as there is no well-
deﬁned budget constraint of a ﬁnite stock of reserves which dwindles down to zero, as in
a conventional speculative attack. As emphasised in Section 2, the key question concerns
the extent to which speculators believe that the central bank is willing to distort monetary
policy in order to sustain the currency regime. For example, if it is believed that the central
bank will not engage in nonsterilised intervention, then an environment of an rsa can come
about when it becomes clear that the instruments for sterilisation are becoming inadequate.
More generally, when it appears that the political costs of sustaining the currency regime are
unsustainable, a rsa could ensue.
Kletzer & Spiegel (1998) ﬁnd that the spikes in estimated ﬁscal costs during capital inﬂow
surges may represent periods of speculative attack on nominal exchange rate pegs, where the
central bank is actively attempting to prevent exchange rate appreciation.
4.3 Fiscal aspects
In the case of sterilised intervention, Calvo (1991) warned about the ‘quasi-ﬁscal costs’ which
ensue when central banks exchange high-yielding domestic government debt for foreign secu-
11rities typically paying lower nominal yields. Quasi-ﬁscal costs (qfc) include the accounts of
parastatal enterprises such as the central bank.
It is important to emphasise that qfc only pertain to sterilised intervention, where there is a
manifestly visible substitution of a high interest rate security by a low interest rate security.
One additional correction, which needs to be borne in mind, is that the conventional estimates
of qfc are upwardly biased insofar as the higher interest rates on Indian government bonds
partly reﬂect a risk premium for higher credit risk.
The ﬁscal costs of sustaining a currency regime may thus be expressed as the sum of three
components:
1. Quasi-ﬁscal costs of sterilisation (if sterilised intervention is taking place),
2. Speculative losses suﬀered when implementing a crawling peg, and
3. Speculative losses in a speculative attack or a reverse speculative attack, in the event that such
a speculative attack should take place.
These costs are generally not transparently visible on the balance sheet of the central bank.
However, these costs are genuine economic costs and need to be recognised as such.
4.3.1 International experience with quasi-ﬁscal costs of sterilised intervention
Surges in capital inﬂows in a number of countries such as those in the Paciﬁc Basin in the 1980s
and early 1990s led to concerns about the implications of capital inﬂows for the exchange rate.
If the exchange rate was ﬂoating, these inﬂows could lead to an appreciation of the currency,
and loss of competitiveness. Many central banks resorted to sterilised intervention, in order
to try to have a currency policy without simultaneously subordinating monetary policy.
Calvo et al. (1993) and Khan & Reinhart (1994) report estimates of quasi-ﬁscal costs for
Latin America, based on observed spreads between domestic and foreign assets, and the size
of foreign exchange reserves. Their studies indicate that these costs can go up to 0.25 to 0.5
per cent of GDP. Kletzer & Spiegel (1998) report estimates of quasi-ﬁscal costs for the Paciﬁc
Basin nations with similar magnitudes, but show that surges in capital inﬂows can result in
quasi-ﬁscal costs rising up to over one percent of GDP. They say:
If QFC represent a signiﬁcant cost to government, it may play a role in the timing of
the abandonment of a sterilisation program. Since the sterilisation program represents
an eﬀort to maintain a downward peg on a nominal exchange rate while maintaining a
monetary policy objective, a central bank that decides that these costs have become too
high will rationally choose to abandon such a program, either by allowing is exchange rate
to appreciate or its money supply to rise.
The response to rising quasi-ﬁscal costs has varied across countries. Kletzer & Spiegel (1998)
ﬁnd that in response to rising qfc, Philippines, Mexico and Taiwan reduced the extent of
sterilisation. While the increase in domestic credit was still contained, it no longer fully
oﬀset the impact of capital inﬂows. Other countries, such as Indonesia, Korea and Singapore
maintained their sterilisation programs in the face of quasi-ﬁscal cost surges. In these countries
domestic credit growth did not expand.
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Another response to rising qfc has been to give up the erstwhile currency policy. In Singapore,
after the sudden rise in inﬂows, the central bank reduced its intervention in the forex market.
Consequently, the nominal and real exchange rate appreciated signiﬁcantly. Similarly, Chile
and Spain widened their exchange rate band and allowed some appreciation (Kletzer & Spiegel
1998).
5 Episode I
With this conceptual framework, we now turn to a closer examination of two episodes where
the relationships between currency intervention and monetary policy are clearly visible.
5.1 Initiation
The ﬁrst episode that we study was caused by the surge of capital inﬂows in 1993-94 and
1994-95.
This inﬂow was partly the result of allowing foreign institutional investors (FIIs) to invest
in Indian stock markets for the ﬁrst time, greater ﬂexibility for foreign direct investment
(FDI), etc. FII inﬂows rose from $307 million over July-September 1993, to $935 million over
October-December 1993, to $2283 million over January-March 1994.
The net capital inﬂow of over USD 9 billion during 1993-94 and 1994-95, though small by
world standards, was over thrice that in previous years (see Table 1).
We identify Episode I as running from March 1993 to April 1995. However, in order to better
understand this period, it proves to be useful to also examine data for some months before
and after these dates.
5.2 Policy stance
Faced with this surge in capital ﬂows, policy makers needed to make choices about currency
intervention, sterilisation, etc. As Virmani (2001) observes:
“In dealing with the monetary and exchange rate implications of the ﬂow a three fold
strategy was suggested:


















































































Net purchase of dollars
Rupees/dollar
1. To absorb the temporary part of the upsurge in reserves and to partially sterilize the reserve
build-up. The inﬂation rate would be carefully watched so that the sterilised proportion
could be stepped up if pressure built up on the inﬂation front.
2. To not sterilise the permanent increase in the inﬂow so that it could increase the capital
available in the economy, reduce real interest rates and stimulate investment.
3. To accelerate the opening up of the current and capital account to improve the eﬃciency
of the economy so that these permanent inﬂows would be productively utilised.”
Similarly, Acharya (2002) observes:
“Partial sterilisation of the foreign asset cumulation was undertaken through an in-
crease in reserve requirements and some open market sale of government securities by the
RBI . Fuller sterilisation operations were constrained by:
• The lack of depth in the government securities market,
• The sharp increase in new goverment securities because of major ﬁscal slippage in 1993-94
and
• A policy choice not to throttle monetary expansion at early stages of an investment boom.”
Through such thought processes, RBI chose to engage in large scale intervention on the
currency market. In particular, for a period that ran from 15/11/1993 to 3/3/1995, RBI
eﬀectively chose to operate a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with Rs.31.37 per dollar.
5.3 Consequences
In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, there is a possibility of dramatic speculative attack. Apart
from this, the normal operation of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime does not induce currency
speculation. However, this does introduce extreme reserves volatility. In India’s case, in
Episode I, in order to support the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, RBI had to resort to buying
USD on the market on a large scale.




























































Net credit to government
Net foreign exchange assets
Table 2 Monetary tightening in Episode I
Date Action
11-Jun-1994 Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) was raised from 14% to 14.5%.
09-Jul-1994 CRR was raised to 14.75%.
06-Aug-1994 CRR was raised to 15%.
29-Oct-1994 CRR for Foreign Currency Non-Resident (FCNR) Accounts was raised
from 0% to 7.5%.
21-Jan-1995 CRR for Non-Resident accounts raised from 0% to 7.5%, and CRR for
FCNR accounts was raised to 15%.
17-Jul-1995 Conditions for overdraft facility to stock brokers to draw money from
banks were made more stringent.
Figure 3 shows that net foreign exchange assets increased sharply as a consequence of the
currency intervention. For a variety of reasons, RBI chose to not engage in sterilisation
through transactions on the secondary market. RBI credit to the government did not go
down in order to compensate for currency intervention.
Hence, money supply grew sharply. Growth rates of over 20 per cent in M3 were witnessed
in the second half of 1994. This was accompanied by an increase in the inﬂation rate. By
December 1994 inﬂation had risen to over 15 per cent. (Figure 4). Whether inﬂation rose
due to monetary factors or real side constraints is debatable, however, monetary policy was
conducted within the RBI’s intellectual framework where it was believed that higher monetary
growth can be inﬂationary.
As a consequence, this led to an attempt by RBI to control the growth of money supply
by reducing credit oﬀtake, so as to contain the money multiplier. In an attempt to impact
upon m, the cash reserve ratio was raised in June 1994. RBI consistently raised reserve
requirements over the next few months (Table 2).
Figure 5 shows the phase of monetary tightening in 1994-95, as reﬂected in the short end of















































































































16Table 3 Evolution of BOP in Episode II
(Billion USD)
Current account Net capital Change in
balance Inﬂows Reserves
1999-00 -4.7 10.2 +5.5
2000-01 -2.6 9.0 +4.3
2001-02 +1.4 9.5 +11.8
2002-03 +3.7 13.3 +21.3
the yield curve. The sharp rise in the 90 day rate between Jan 1994 and July 1995 took place
at a time when money supply growth was high, even going beyond 20 per cent per annum.
While this is puzzling, it might be explained partly by the thinness of the market and RBI’s
inability to sterilise monetary expansion while being able to impact short term rates directly.
Since the capital account was only partially open, higher interest rates did not directly attract
additional capital. From September 1994 onwards, the equity index produced weak returns.
Episode I may be said to have ended in 1995, when the volume of net capital inﬂows fell to
nearly half that of the 1993-95 levels. Reserve money growth declined and M3 growth fell.
In this episode even though the RBI intervened to keep the nominal exchange rate ﬁxed, the
real exchange rate appreciated due to higher inﬂation in India. By 1995-96 the current account
deﬁcit had again risen to nearly USD 6 billion and was higher than net capital inﬂows thus
depleting reserves, bringing down the growth in the monetary base and the stock of money.
6 Episode II
We identify Episode II as having commenced in April 2002. As of September 2003, this
episode has not yet ended.
6.1 Initiation
In this period, oﬃcial documents sometimes refer to currency interventions as being motivated
by ‘a capital surge’. However, the evidence (Table 3) shows a remarkably stable capital
account in 2001-01 and 2001-02. From 1999-00 to 2001-02, net capital inﬂows into India were
stable at roughly $10 billion per year. In contrast, it was the current account which switched
around, from a deﬁcit of $4.7 billion (1999-00) to a surplus of $1.4 billion (2001-02). This
change (of $6.1 billion per year) was the major change which took place over this period.
Thus, in contrast with Episode I, this time, currency intervention was ﬁrst motivated by a
current account surplus rather than by a capital surge. The capital surge only took place
from 2002-03 onwards. Foreign exchange reserves with the RBI grew sharply in 2001-02, that
is, before the increase in capital inﬂows in the following year.







































Table 4 Sources of reserve money growth in Episode II
Year ∆NFA RBI Credit Reserve ∆NFA/
to Govt. Money ∆RM
(Rs. crore)
1997-98 21,073 10,979 26,417 0.80
1998-99 22,064 17,379 32,884 0.67
1999-00 27,926 -4,275 21,269 1.31
2000-01 31,295 5,613 22,756 1.38
2001-02 66,794 -1,699 34,659 1.93
2002-03 94,275 -32,076 30,961 3.04
6.2 Policy stance
Figure 6 shows that RBI’s intervention and the increase in net foreign exchange assets of the
RBI have been systematically sterilized by open market operations of the RBI. In this ﬁgure,
we see a striking and inverse relationship, where months with high purchases of USD were
months where substantial sale of GOI bonds took place.
Through this, reserve money did not grow despite the increase in NFA. Instead, the share of
NFA in reserve money increased sharply from 0.65 in 2001 to 0.78 in 2002 to 0.98 in 2003.
Figure 7 shows the sharp decline in the share of RBI credit to the government in reserve
money. As a consequence growth of reserve money remained under control (Table 4).
Since sterilisation was possible through the simplest route, i.e. open market operations, the
route to reducing money supply through changes in reserve requirements, as in the ﬁrst
episode, was not required. On the contrary, the cash reserve ratio was reduced as part of the
long term monetary policy objective of reducing ﬁnancial repression and the burden on the
banking sector. Figure 8 shows the steady pace of reducing CRR in this period.

























































Net credit to government
Net foreign exchange assets









































































































































Table 5 Counterfactual: Episode II without sterilisation
Year Sterilisation Modiﬁed RM M3 growth
Simulated Actual
1999-00 -4,275 284,830 16.35% 14.60%
2000-01 5,613 297,698 12.79% 16.67%
2001-02 -1,699 339,669 17.11% 14.37%
2002-03 -32,076 401,007 24.34% 14.97%
As a consequence, the money multiplier increased in value during this period (Figure 9).
However, as a result of the large scale of sterilisation and the low growth of reserve money,
the growth of money supply remained under control, despite the cuts in CRR and the increase
in the money multiplier. Inﬂation was fairly low, and except for a few months when it rose
due to the impact of higher petroleum and edible oil prices, it remained within acceptable
levels (Figure 10).
Since money supply growth remained under control, the need to tighten money supply by
pushing up interest rates as in the case of the ﬁrst episode, also did not arise. On the contrary,
interest rates were lowered as part of the a softer interest rate regime. Since inﬂation rates
had declined, real interest rates were high. The bank rate and repo rates were reduced by the
RBI during this period. Figure 11 shows the time-series of the short rate on the spot yield
curve.
Sterilisation was central to this set of outcomes. Table 5 shows the growth of M3, had the
RBI had not sterilized its forex intervention. In 2002-03, M3, which grew by 13.75 per cent,
would have grown by 24.3 per cent. At this time, the targeted levels of money supply growth
were 15-16 per cent, so growth of 24 percent would have been unacceptable. In 1994, when
money supply growth had been allowed to rise to over 20 per cent, there had been attempts
at severe monetary tightening. In the absence of open market operations, this growth might
21Table 6 Counterfactual: Episode II using m of 1995-96
Year Sterilisation Modiﬁed RM M3 growth
Simulated Actual
1999-00 -4,275 284,830 9.85% 14.60%
2000-01 5,613 297,698 4.52% 16.67%
2001-02 -1,699 339,669 14.10% 14.37%
2002-03 -32,076 401,007 18.06% 14.97%
Table 7 Quasi-ﬁscal costs in Episode II
Year NFA Interest QFC as percent of
($ Bln.) diﬀerence GDP Interest Exp
2001-02 55 4.5 0.56 8.05
2002-03 75 3.5 0.56 8.53
2003-04(Projected) 100 3.5 0.67 11.38
have been contained by sharp increases in the cash reserve ratio.
Table 6 shows that if the money multiplier had been raised to the 1995-96 levels, money supply
growth could have been brought down to 18 per cent. RBI policy of sterilising its intervention
was able to contain money supply growth without raising higher reserve requirements or
interest rates. In other words, money supply and inﬂation in Episode II were controlled
without the ﬁnancial repression and tight monetary policy that marked Episode I.
6.3 Consequences
Through this episode, to the extent that speculators have been able to successfully forecast
the exchange rate, RBI has been incurring speculative losses. Further, by sterilising its inter-
vention the RBI prevents domestic interest rates from falling. This prevents the absorbtion
of capital inﬂows into the economy by a rise in investment. Growth foregone due to sterilised
intervention can be signiﬁcant (Lal et al. 2002).
In this section, we focus on the quasi-ﬁscal costs of sterilised intervention. We estimate the
quasi-ﬁscal costs of the sterilized intervention in 2001-02, using ideas from Kletzer & Spiegel
(1998). We focus on the interest diﬀerential between the returns on domestic government
bonds and foreign interest rates times the amount of foreign exchange reserves held by the
central bank. Our estimates are based on interest diﬀerentials as estimated by RBI (RBI
2003).
Our estimates suggest that sterilised intervention by the RBI between April 2001 and March
2002 cost an estimated Rs 2813.3 crores as QFC. This is about 0.56 percent of GDP in both
2001-02 and 2002-03. (Table 7). If reserves were to rise to USD 100 billion next year, and
assuming GDP growth and inﬂation rates of 6 per cent each, quasi-ﬁscal costs could rise to
0.67 per cent of GDP or roughly 11% of the interest expenses of GOI. These are substantial
values, when compared with the experience of other countries which have attempted sterilised
intervention. If USD 25 billion are added to reserves in 2003-04 then with an average interest
22diﬀerential over the year of 4 percent and the INR/USD rate at Rs 47 there will be an
additional cost of Rs 4500 crore to the RBI.
6.4 India’s currency forward market as a unique source of information
The INR/USD forward market is a particularly important source of information about cur-
rency expectations. In a conventional forward market, arbitrage strongly deﬁnes what the
forward rate should be. Even if there are strong speculative views and positions on the mar-
ket, in a normal forward market, there is no interesting interpretation that we can attach to
the level of the forward premium - since this is purely determined by covered interest parity.
When violations of market eﬃciency arise, near-inﬁnite capital comes into play in arbitrage,
and tends to push the forward price back to fair value.
The forward market in India, in contrast, is an interesting source of information because
RBI rules impose sharp restrictions upon the ability of banks to engage in covered interest
parity arbitrage. This serves to break the link between the spot and the derivative. Oﬃcial
pronouncements from the RBI have periodically claimed that this extreme policy position,
which makes an eﬃcient dollar-rupee forward market impossible, is driven by the goal of
separating currency policy from monetary policy.
When arbitrage does not determine prices, information from the forward market is genuinely
interesting insofar as it conveys expectations about the future. If economic agents expect the
rupee to depreciate, there would be a greater interest in selling rupees forward – exporters
would stay unhedged, and importers would be likely to hedge. Conversely, if economic agents
expect the rupee to appreciate, there would be greater interest in buying rupees forward.
If RBI rules did not restrict arbitrage, then the forward premium would be non-informative.
Under the existing policy framework, it is a uniquely useful market-based measure of future
expectations; one that is not available in other countries where regulators do not inhibit
arbitrage.
The arithmetic of forward pricing is based on ‘covered interest parity’. Covered interest parity
involves comparing two routes for riskless USD investment. An investor could convert $1 into
(1 + ru)T through ru, which is obtained from the US zero coupon yield curve for T years.
Alternatively, the investor could convert into INR at the spot price S, invest in the GOI zero
coupon yield curve and obtain a locked-in cashﬂow of S(1 + ri)T/F by converting back into
USD at the rate F at date T. Under no-arbitrage, these two investment strategies have to
yield an identical return, through which the fair value for F can be computed. Once we know
the fair value, we can measure the error when compared with the observed market price.
Apart from conveying expectations of the market, the error between the observed forward
premium and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to a foreign investor.
6.5 Speculative capital inﬂows
In Episode I, when RBI chose to prevent the appreciation of the rupee, the exchange rate
stayed ﬁxed at Rs.31.37 for an extended period of time. This was like a ﬁxed exchange rate
23Figure 12 INR appreciation in Episode II
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regime, and the key question (from a speculative viewpoint) was about when the peg would
be abandoned.
In Episode II, there was no rate around which the RBI tried to defend the USD. RBI has fol-
lowed a policy of preventing large moves of the currency, so that on most days, the INR/USD
exchange rate has changed by less than Rs.0.1. This has given trends in the exchange rate
(see Figure 12). At the same time, the volatility of the INR-USD exchange rate was unusually
low (See Figure 13). Hence, economic agents faced a situation where it appeared that future
exchange rates could be forecasted with a certain degree of conﬁdence.
Apart from time-series forecasting by economic agents, we may also expect considerations
based on qfc. With the level of the reserves rising, and high quasi-ﬁscal costs associated
with sterilisation, there could be expectations of a more ﬂexible currency policy. In addition,
this was a period where the US dollar had been sharply depreciating versus the Euro and the
Yen. This could have raised expectations of a rupee appreciation.
There are three elements of evidence about the extent to which economic agents have tried
to setup positions based on currency forecasts.
Forward premium Figure 14 superposes the fair value of the forward premium for the 90-day for-
ward market, computed through covered interest parity, and the actual forward premium ob-
served in India. This shows that until July 2002, the observed premium was higher than the
fair value. This reﬂected expectations of a currency depreciation. From July 2002 till November
2002, the forward premium was at value derived from covered interest parity. From November
2002 onwards, the market forward premium dropped below the fair value.
From March 2003 onwards, the forward premium has dropped sharply. This partly merely
reﬂects the change in fair value (i.e. changes in the 90-day rate in India and in the US).
However, there has also been a widening of the gap between the two series.
Figure 15 shows the time-series of the error between the actual and the fair value of the


















































































































































INR/USD forward premium. This highlights the change, between expectations of deprecia-
tion from March 2002 to May 2002, and the expectations of appreciation seen from November
2002 onwards.
Apart from conveying expectations of the market, the error between the observed forward pre-
mium and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to a foreign investor. In
recent months, this shows excess returns of over 200 basis points, for a foreigner who buys GOI
bonds and has a locked-in repatriation into USD at a future date using the forward market.2
Going by this ﬁgure, under conditions like those prevalent from March 2002 to May 2002, there
are incentives to take capital out of India. Under conditions like those prevalent from November
2002 onwards, there are incentives to bring capital into India.
NRI deposits The period after June 2002 has also seen an increase in NRI deposits, especially the
rupee denominated NRE deposits, as interest rates higher than international rates combined
with expectations of rupee appreciation, make these rupee deposits attractive. Non Resident
External (NRE) accounts are repatriable accounts, a facility for non-resident Indians whereby
which they can deposit foreign currency in Indian banks in rupee accounts and withdraw money
in the foreign currency. This gives them the rupee rate of interest as well as a return due
to currency appreciation or depreciation. High interest diﬀerentials and expectations of rupee
appreciation create arbitrage opportunities for capital inﬂows into NRE accounts. 2002-03 saw a
sharp increase in deposits in NRE accounts. An RBI statement issued on the subject, however,
shows that part of this is due to retirement of NRNR accounts, a facility that has been closed
since April 2002. The total deposits in NRI deposits has not increased beyond trend levels.
They rose from USD 2728 million in 2001-02 to USD 2804 million in 2002-03.
FII purchase of debt In recent weeks, there has been a sharp increase in the purchases by FIIs of
2Strictly, the observed forward premium should be slightly higher than that computed from covered interest
parity, owing to the country credit risk premium required for India exposure. However, the failure probability
of a GOI bond on a 90-day horizon is likely to have been negligible through this period. Hence, this is unlikely
to be an important issue in our analysis.
26Table 8 Summarising Episode I and Episode II
Aspect Episode I Episode II
Initiation Liberalisation on capital account Current account
Policy stance
Currency regime Fixed parity Crawling peg
Sterilisation Partial Full
Consequences Monetary expansion; ﬁnancial re-
pression
Monetary targets attained; Specula-
tive losses; quasi-ﬁscal costs.
debt. This is consistent with the existence of exceptionally attractive rates of return faced by
capital inﬂows into India.
FIIs as a whole face a ceiling of investment of no more than $1.5 billion in government securities.
Hence, this is not a channel through which substantial capital ﬂows can materialise. However,
this does constitute a source of information about currency expectations, and the responses of
rational agents.
7 Conclusions
A key insight into Indian macroeconomic policy today is based on the impossible trinity.
India has broadly had a de facto peg to the USD, with very low currency volatility, from 1979
onwards. In the early years of this regime, India did not face the impossible trinity, owing
to harsh currency controls based on fera. In that world, it was accurate to argue that the
implementation of currency policy could be done without substantial costs.
Starting from 1993, and particularly in the last ﬁve years, India has obtained a revolution
in terms of external sector policy, owing to greater openness on the current account and the
capital account. This gave substantial ﬂexibility to domestic and foreign economic agents to
move resources across the border, and to engage in currency speculation.
This revolution requires a fresh analytical paradigm for thinking about questions surrounding
the currency regime. This openness implies that Indian macro policy is increasingly con-
strained by the impossible trinity. In this world, preservation of the de facto peg to the USD,
with very low currency volatility, would increasingly crowd out autonomous monetary policy.
We see such constraints upon policy, in operation during the two episodes examined in this
paper.
In Episode I, the impact on the exchange rate of a surge in capital inﬂows in 1993 was sought
to be blocked by currency interventions. This had major consequences for monetary policy
over 1994-1996. Partial sterilisation was done, through monetary tightening which reduced
the money multiplier. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Episode I was the extent to
which a small external sector, and extremely small capital inﬂows, were able to impact upon
a substantially larger domestic economy.
Speculative behaviour in Episode I was muted, for two reasons. First, in Episode I, RBI
chose to operate a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, there are no
proﬁt opportunities on a day-to-day basis. There may be dramatic proﬁts when a speculative
27attack brings down the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. However, Episode I did not end in a
dramatic speculative attack. The second issue was openness on the current account and the
capital account. In the early 1990s, India had begun some limited steps towards freeing up the
current account and the capital account. However, there were relatively few vehicles through
which economic agents could express speculative views.
Episode II, which has not yet ended, diﬀers from Episode I in many interesting ways. Episode
II began as a current account problem. The currency regime consisted of a crawling peg and
not a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. This lent itself to opportunities for speculation, and thus
created a surge of capital inﬂows.
By this time, India had made major progress in having a secondary market for government
bonds. Hence, sterilisation was feasible through open market operations. RBI used these
with considerable success to attain goals of monetary policy. However, sterilised interven-
tion is at best a short-term and limited response. It does not constitute a solution to the
underlying problems. The direct ‘budget constraint’ that will be faced stems from the fact
that RBI has a limited stock of government bonds which can be sold in sterilisation. In ad-
dition, sterilisation is fundamentally self-defeating by preventing the downward adjustment
of domestic interest rates. In an equilibrium outcome, preservation of currency policy would
require ceding monetary policy, and accepting lower domestic interest rates.
Episode II has also highlighted the ﬁscal costs of implementing the existing currency regime,
both through losses against speculators, and quasi-ﬁscal costs. The recent drop in RBI proﬁts
may reﬂect these phenomena at work.
These episodes highlight the applicability of the logic of open economy macroeconomics for
India today. The arguments of this paper suggest that India has made enough progress
on opening the capital account, that currency policy comes at the price of distortions in
monetary policy. This is a diﬀerent environment from that present in preceding decades,
when it appeared that it was possible to have currency policy without a price in loss of
autonomy on monetary policy.
Episode II has also given India a taste of how every currency peg is vulnerable to currency
forecasting and speculation. While there may be rules in place which apparently prevent
certain forms of currency speculation, it is important that policy analysis is not conducted
assuming a closed capital account. There is enough openness on the current account and the
capital account, through which currency speculation is taking place.
In terms of currency ﬂexibility, India is strikingly embedded in the economic philosophy of the
late 1970s. This paper has argued that in the new framework of capital account convertibility,
there are new costs of upholding such a currency regime. The beneﬁts of this currency
regime may well outweigh these costs. But it is important that these costs be recognised,
measured, and factored into policy analysis. Thus, the ideas of this paper could be useful
in new thinking about the costs and beneﬁts of this currency regime, and an evaluation of
alternative approaches to the currency regime.
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